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Abstract
Over the last year there has been an extreme devaluation of technology stocks and an
alarming number of companies either laying off employees or going out of business. A
significant portion of these companies are dot coms, the same companies that just two years
ago were credited with revolutionizing the way business is done and with ushering in the
"new" economy.
On March 10,2000 the "new" economy peaked when the NASDAQ Composite Index
closed at a record high of 5,048.62 points. Soon thereafter the market started to slide. The
slide evolved into a year-long fall and on March 12,2001 the NASDAQ closed at 1,923.38
points. What was the reason for such a dramatic downturn?
As it turned out the viability of many of the dot coms was called into question. Analysts had
serious doubts whether the "revolutionary" companies could ever become profitable. After
all, some of the most celebrated dot coms had yet to earn a profit. Companies like
Priceline.com had received hundreds of millions of dollars in financing, had extremely
lucrative initial public offerings, and yet continued to show a loss. Business owners and
investors alike searched for reasons behind the poor performances.
It was soon apparent that the assumptions on which many of these companies were basing
their business decisions were inaccurate. Those assumptions and the reasons for their
inaccuracies are examined through a series of discussions. Once those inaccuracies are
addressed, several profit seeking concepts, based on traditional business principles, are
defined. In addition, effects of the Internet on those concepts are examined. Finally,
Priceline's situation is analyzed and recommendations are made that demonstrate the
relevance of traditional business principles in today's economy.
These discussions show that the economy has evolved as a result of the Internet, but it is not
necessarily new. Though powerful and exciting, the Internet is only a tool. No tool, not even
the Intemet, can make traditional business principles obsolete. The events over the past year
are a testament to that fact.
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Introduction
Prior to the year 2000 the phrase "dot com" was somewhat prestigious. Droves of
people left high-ranking positions with established companies to work for dot-com
companies. Businesses that had a ".com" after their names seemed to be instantly credible
and worthy of millions upon millions of investment dollars. And why not - companies like
Netscape, Yahoo!, and Amazon were making investors wealthy beyond their wildest dreams.
Quick and profitable returns from Internet investments became very popular. A large return
with minimal effort was the ultimate status symbol (Napoli, 2000).
Yahoo! provides an example of the type of dot-com company investors pursued.
Currently Yahoo! is a global Internet communications, commerce, and media company that
offers a branded network of services to millions of users daily (Yahoo.com, 2000). David
Filo and Jerry Yang, Ph.D. candidates in Electrical Engineering at Stanford University,
founded the company in 1994. In April of that year the two developers started compiling lists
to keep track of their personal interests on the Internet (Hill & Jones, 1997). As they grew,
the lists became more and more complex. Eventually the lists were converted into a
customized database designed to serve the needs of the thousands of users beginning to use
the service - Yahoo! was bom. On April 12,1996 Yahoo! went public. Its stock opened at
$24.50 per share and on January 4, 2000 its share price reached an all-time high of $250.00
{The Wall Street Journal, 2000).
Well-publicized companies like Yahoo!, Netscape, and Amazon took center stage in
the business world. As a result of the hype surrounding their initial performance on the stock
market and the continued growth of the Internet, virtually every market was saturated by "me
1

too" companies. New companies desperately tried to parlay the power of the Internet into the
perceived financial success associated with the notoriety of the dot coms (Napoli, 2000).
During the 1990's it appeared that most Internet ventures would do just that. Venture
capitalists (VCs) were quick to fund new Internet related businesses and for good reason.
Monstrous Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) seemed an everyday occurrence and early dot-com
investors made millions of dollars. Unfortunately, the market conditions that fueled the start
up craze during the 1990's would not last forever.
In March of 2000 analysts began to question the viability of the dot coms. VCs soon
realized that many companies they were investing in were not actually viable businesses
(Napoli, 2000). This realization cast an ominous shadow over all dot coms and suddenly an
investment once considered a sure thing was deemed risky. This had a dramatic effect on the
financial markets. Stock prices of the dot coms, which had been fueling the markets, faltered
(See Exhibit A). Yahoo! illustrates this point. In October of 2000, just ten months after its
share price reached an all-time high of $250.00, it had fallen to $45.00 {The Wall Street
Journal, 2000). Securing second and third-round funding became more difficult as analysts
and investors grew increasingly cautious. In the end, many dot coms could not survive (See
Appendix A). APBNews.com was one such company.
APBNews provided a Website that covered the nation's justice, criminal, and safety
system and it recently went out of business (Davidson, 2000). During its nine-month
existence, APBNews lured high quality, experienced journalists by offering substantial
salaries and stock options. It steadily increased its payroll by eventually hiring 140 writers
and support staff. In June of 2000 APBNews announced it was laying off all employees
because it was out of money. Ironically, just days after the announcement. The National
2

Press Club named APBNews the Web's best news website (Kelsey, June 2000). The
company filed for bankruptcy one month later (Kelsey, July 2000).
How could these things happen? How could a news website like APBNews, which
produced award-winning content, go out of business? How could the market value of a
company like Yahoo! drop 82 percent in ten months? The answer in a nutshell is that many
analysts, investors, and the dot coms themselves were caught up in the euphoria of the "new"
economy. They were so caught up that they overlooked some important business principles.
These oversights provide the foundation for examining the recent decline of dot-com
companies.

Paper Overview
This paper is intended to demonstrate that, although the economy of today has
evolved as a result of the Internet, traditional business principles are still relevant. The first
section addresses some of the terminology frequently used in the popular press. The section
then defines the difference between e-business and e-commerce and addresses the "new"
economy debate. Clarifications made in the first section are the basis for the second section,
which focuses on some of the specific business principles that have been overlooked. The
second section also examines how the selected principles have evolved as a result of the
technological advances of the past 30 years. It concludes by summarizing the principles
discussed using the strategy development and implementation model.
The third section examines one of the most well-known dot coms today Priceline.com. A brief history of the company is presented and recommendations made as to
how Priceline might use the principles discussed in the paper to achieve true financial
3

success. To further justify the suggestions, a comparison is made between the performances
of Priceline and an industry competitor that also uses the Internet to reach its customers.
Finally, the paper summarizes various arguments made throughout the paper and examines
their collective contributions and limitations.

4

Common Misconceptions
The rapid evolution and integration of the Internet into the world of business spawned
a plethora of new terminology and phrases. While many terms are straightforward, e.g. "email," other terms are broader and take on multiple meanings. These terms are hard to define
because people use them differently. For instance, many people use the terms "Internet" and
"World Wide Web" interchangeably, when in reality they are two different things.
The Internet is a vast collection of computer networks interconnected both physically
and through their ability to encode and decode certain specialized communications protocols
(Afuah & Tucci, 2000). The World Wide Web is the collection of computers on the Internet
that support a hypertext function that allows users to follow items of interest in a nonlinear
fashion by selecting words or pictures of interest and immediately gaining more information
on the items selected (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). The World Wide Web actually runs on the
Internet, so by definition the Internet and the World Wide Web are two different things. This
paper will generally use the term Internet in reference to the many ways companies can use
the Internet to improve business functions. This includes, but is not limited to the World
Wide Web.
The terms e-business and e-commerce and the phrase "the new economy" are also
used without much thought being given to their actual meanings. As this paper focuses
specifically on how businesses are using not only the terminology, but also the technology it
refers to, these terms must be clearly defined and examined. The examination of the
interpretation and application of recent technological advances is also important because they
serve as the basis of the discussions throughout this paper.

5

The Internet
As stated, the Internet is a network of computer networks. This description is not
meant to downplay the impact that the Internet has had on the economy over the last ten
years, but rather to provide perspective. It helps to think of the Internet as a multiple purpose
tool because it has a universal reach, acts as a distribution channel, and streamlines the
interactions between transacting parties (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). As is evident in this
description, the Internet is indeed a powerful tool. However, the Internet, like any tool, has
limitations.
The Internet cannot be used as a substitute for business strategy or for the underlying
principles on which business strategies are founded. For example, if a construction company
acquired the latest and greatest tool available and trained its employees to use it, could that
company then substitute that tool in place of its business strategy? Would constructing high
quality projects for its customers no longer be important? Would profitability become
irrelevant? The answer to all of these questions is a resounding "No." There simply is no
tool, no matter how powerful, that a business could use in place of business strategy, quality
products, and profitability.
The Internet Does Not Deserve All The Credit
Unfortunately, many companies made the mistake of using the Internet for jobs it was
never intended to do. Part of the reason for this misuse is the dramatic effect the Internet has
had on the economy over the last ten years. In the early 1990's, as the Internet transitioned
from a government-funded entity used by universities and researchers to the commercially
driven entity that it is today, the economy boomed. That sudden boom gave the impression
6

that the Internet alone could do almost anything. In reality, though, it is not just the Internet
that should be credited with changing the way the world works and communicates. After all,
the Internet infrastructure has been around since the late 1960's (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). The
past 30 years have seen a number of other technological advances that have contributed to
changing today's economy perhaps even more than the Internet.
Consider the introduction of the personal computer (PC), which coincided with the
introduction of the microprocessor in the early 1970's. As prices dropped and microprocessor
technology advanced, the PC continued to evolve. In the early 1980's the modem
microcomputer, now simply known as a computer, was introduced (Encyclopedia Britannica,
2000). As technological advances drove prices down, companies like Microsoft and Apple
made computers easier to use. With the introduction of graphical user interfaces (GUIs),
computers were accessible to the average user and soon widely adopted {Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2000). These events preceded the Internet as it is known today and deserve just
as much of the credit for impacting today's economy. In fact, the introduction of the PC and
widespread growth in its use provided the infrastructure necessary for the applications and
uses of the Internet today.

e-Business vs. e-Commerce
E-business and e-conmierce are both loosely defined as doing business via the
Internet. Much like the terms Internet and the World Wide Web, e-business and e-commerce
are related; however, the terms are not interchangeable. E-business is actually more of an
umbrella-term for a company that uses the Internet or the Web to facilitate any business
function (Techweb.com, 2000). E-commerce, on the other hand, implies that goods or
7

services can actually be purchased (Techweb.com, 2000). To illustrate this distinction, an ebusiness website may be very comprehensive and offer more than just the ability to purchase
products or services. For example, it may feature a general search facility, the ability to track
shipments, or have an area designated for threaded discussions. In this instance, e-commerce
is only the order and payment-processing component of the site.
As a general rule, any time a business uses the Internet to conduct a business process,
whether it is simply communicating through e-mail or marketing its product or services
through an elaborately developed website, it is participating in e-business. Conversely, a
business is participating in e-commerce if and only if its customers have the ability to order
and purchase its products or services via the Internet.

Is There A New Economy?
Another term that is often used today is "the new economy." Although technological
advances since 1970 have changed the very way in which businesses and consumers interact,
have they actually resulted in a "new" economy? A comparison of traditional mail and e-mail
can be used to help clarify the conceptual basis of this question. Traditional mail is sent and
received very differently from e-mail. However, the concept of sending a document of some
sort from one location to another is essentially the same. For instance, reliability, expediency,
and security are relevant with both methods.
A similar standard can be applied to the economy. Although today's post-Intemet
economy differs from the pre-Intemet economy, it is fundamentally the same. Or is it? There
are powerful arguments on both sides, which make the debate worth examining.
Much has been said about the "new" economy in recent months. Politicians are trying
to take credit for it, numerous books are trying to help people master it, and businesses are
8

struggling to survive in it. Ironically, even though so much has been written and said about
the "new" economy in the recent months, no one seems to know exactly what it is. Those that
have been brave enough to define today's economy cite the shift from the industrial age to
the information age as the basis of their definition (Wired, 2000). The question remains: Is
the post-Internet economy actually different from the pre-Intemet economy? Or rather - Is
there a "new" economy?

Distinguishing Economic Characteristics
Before this question can be addressed, a framework of similar characteristics must be
established so that comparisons can be made and conclusions reached. Since the post-Intemet
economy has not been around long, problems arise. Its relative newness makes it difficult to
produce a clear definition that correlates with established concepts. Despite the difficulties
involved, it makes sense to seek out common economic characteristics. Many of the wideranging qualitative and quantitative economic models are beyond the scope of this
discussion; still, a rational comparison can be made using basic economic theory.
The primary characteristic selected for comparison is output growth. However,
unemployment rates and inflation rates are also relevant and will be used in the discussion as
well. Output growth depends on two factors - labor productivity growth, the overall gain in
production from one year to the next, and labor supply growth, the overall increase in the
hours worked from one year to the next (Stiroh, 1999). Accurately measuring and comparing
output from one period of time, like the 1950's, to that of another period of time, like the
1990's, is a point of contention among many economists (Stiroh, 1999). For simplicity's
sake, this discussion assumes production measures are accurate over time.
9

Since labor productivity is defined in terms of outputs per hour, it stands to reason
that it relies on the factors that would allow a worker to produce more output per hour of
labor (Stiroh, 1999). For example, labor productivity growth is dependent on factors such as
refined training methods or improved technologies that allow employed individuals to work
more efficiently and produce more output per hour of labor. Labor supply growth is
dependent on factors such as decreased population growth rates or modified workplace
regulations that influence the number of employable individuals available to work in a given
industry (Stiroh, 1999).
Since 1975 both labor productivity and labor supply have grown approximately one
percent per year, so the total output growth of the U.S. economy has been about two or two
and a half percent per year (Krugman, 1997). This increasing growth rate has been achieved
while unemployment rates remained basically constant. Therefore, more people can be
employed from year to year, yet, the overall level of unemployment stays within a range
considered healthy from an economic standpoint (Krugman, 1997). It is considered healthy
because historically, if there were a period of time where unemployment rates fell below
what is considered the natural rate (approximately five and six tenths percent), inflation rates
would climb at an accelerated rate. The opposite held true if unemployment rates climbed
above the natural rate (Krugman, 1997).
To clarify, historically there has been a finite amount of output that could be
produced over a finite period of time. The output growth rate, or rather, the total increase in
products and services produced from one year to the next, could grow only at about two
percent per year. The number of employed individuals available, as well as the rates at which
they could produce the output, both grew only at about one percent per year. Output growth
10

also influenced employment levels, which in turn, affected inflation rates. Specifically, over
the past 25 years, the level of inflation was inversely related to any deviation from the natural
rate of unemployment (Krugman, 1997).
Therefore, the output growth rates and the way in which they interact with
unemployment levels and inflation rates can be considered common characteristics of the
economy before and after the advent of the Internet as it exists today. These periods will be
referred to as the pre- and post-Internet economies for the remainder of this paper. Although
this is admittedly a simplified example, the characteristics used are relevant and are based on
fundamental economic principles. Therefore, if characteristics of the post-Internet economy
interact differently than they did in the pre-Intemet economy, those differences would help
substantiate the existence of a "new" economy.

Analysis Of Characteristic Comparison
When the way in which the output growth rates interacting with unemployment levels
and inflation rates during the 1990's are compared to the interactions over the previous 25
years, significant differences become apparent. The analysis of the post-Internet economy's
characteristics suggests that the U.S. economy would enjoy an on-going period of
permanently faster output growth that would not lead to increased inflation (Shepard, 1997).
Recall that output growth is dependent on labor productivity growth and labor supply growth
and that an increased level of employment historically resulted in inflation. Thus, faster
output growth rates must be due to an increase in labor productivity.
Many attribute the apparent increase in labor productivity to the technological
advances of the 1990's (Shepard, 1997). This sentiment is echoed by "new" economy
11

proponents who believe that today's economy, fueled by a worldwide spread of capitalism,
globalization of businesses, and the information technology revolution, can now grow faster
than before without renewed inflation (Shepard, 1997). How much faster? According to an
article in Business Week, three to four percent annual output growth is now possible. A
significant increase compared to output growth over the past 25 years (Shepard, 1997).
A true increase in output growth rates accompanied by sustained inflation rates would
go a long way in proving that the economy of today is in fact fundamentally different from
the previous economy and therefore "new." The emergence of a "new" economy, where the
old models of business and economics no longer apply and where productivity rates increase
indefinitely, would be unquestionably desirable. However, questions regarding the actual
increase in productivity need to be addressed. For starters, are workers really more
productive?
Economist Stephen Roach calls this the Information Technology Paradox (Roach,
1998). The paradox claims that despite increased spending by American businesses on
information technology, overall productivity has not increased as a direct result of the use of
technology. Investment in information technology quadrupled, rising as a share of business
spending on equipment from 28 percent during the 1980's to 53 percent during the 1990's
(Perkins & Perkins, 1999).
A significant portion of that increase in spending on information technology involves
maintaining and replacing computer hardware, more than $220 billion annually. About 60
percent of annual technology budgets are used for hardware replacements and upgrades. The
remaining 40 percent is allocated to software, service support, and computer management
staff (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). Overall, corporations spent $1.1 trillion on hardware from
12

1990 to 1996, an increase of approximately $143 billion over previous years. Despite the fact
that investment in information technology quadrupled during the 1990's, productivity grew
by only eight tenths of one percent per year - no better than productivity growth over the
previous 25 years (Perkins & Perkins, 1999).
Ironically, although productivity is not rising at a significant rate, the number of hours
the average person works is. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1996 the
average worker spent 148 more hours working than in 1973 - a total of four working weeks
longer. Far from being an era of advances in productivity, the connectivity and the
competition of the post-Internet economy has made it harder for people to get away from
work.
These facts attribute the increases in output growth rates of the post-Internet economy
to the increasing number of labor hours being contributed by existing workers, not
technologically improved production rates. Thus, employment levels remain relatively
constant and inflation rates remain normal. These traditional economic lines of reasoning
suggest that what many consider a "new" economy is simply a progression of the previous
one.
Could there be more non-technological reasons for the recent performance of the
economy? Many opponents of the "new" economy credit the deregulation of businesses and
effective corporate restructuring for competition in global markets for the recent economic
boom. For example. Herb Allen Jr. of investment bank Allen & Co. argued, 'The
streamlining and tightening up of American businesses over the last ten years has paid off."
(Perkins & Perkins, 1999).
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Additional arguments attribute more non-technical credit to the economy's recent
performance. One follows the reasoning that computers pale in comparison to earlier
technological advances such as electricity, the internal combustion engine, or biotech goods
(Gordon, 1998). Customers do not value much of the output that is created in the "new"
economy, often an array of arbitrary information, and some argue that it should not be
considered output (this ties in to the contention among economists that was mentioned
earlier) (Gordon, 1998). In addition, the cost of software upgrades, system compatibility
problems, employee training, and installation downtime combine to reduce the overall
effectiveness of information technology systems (Stiroh, 1999).

Comparison Results
The arguments against the existence of a "new" economy seem to offset the earlier
arguments that supported the existence of a "new" economy and thus, the discussion has
come full circle. Unfortunately, as with many debates, there is no definitive answer. Figures
have been presented that suggest differences in the characteristics of the economy today and
the economy of the last 25 years, specifically when comparing output growth rates of each
period. However, other figures illustrate increased investments in technology have not
resulted in significantly higher productivity rates and attributed the recent economic events to
non-technological factors.
Until more data about long-run productivity trends and the structural relationship
between inflation and unemployment in the post-Internet economy are available, the
fundamental question of whether or not a "new" economy exists will remain unanswered. In
the meantime the term "today's economy" will be used in reference to the economic events
14

of the 1990's. Lessons from the past, however, suggest that it is prudent for most businesses
to temper the hype of the "new" economy and to proceed with caution.
Why should businesses proceed with caution? Although the Internet is a relatively
new phenomenon and its effects on the economy have been hard to ignore, old economic
rules, such as profitability, still apply to businesses competing in today's economy. The
economy has traditionally evolved as new technologies developed and as markets fluctuated.
Two quotations, one from 1929 and the other from 1932, illustrate what history has to say
about mistaking market fluctuations as revolutionary events that make established economic
rules and traditional business principles obsolete.
The first quotation from Forbes magazine was written in June of 1929, just four
months before the stock market crashed. It illustrates the presumptuous and misguided
economic ideology of that time. "For the last five years we have been in a new industrial era
in this country. We are making progress industrially and economically not even by leaps and
bounds, but on a perfectly heroic scale." (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). It seems the existence of
a "new" economy was debated once before.
Three years later, Bernard Baruch (1870 - 1965), who was an adviser to American
presidents on economic matters for more than 40 years (scstatehouse.net, 2000), commented
on the business practices and philosophies of the 1920's that led to the Great Depression. "In
the lamentable era of the 'New Economics' culminating in 1929, even in the presence of
dizzily spiraling prices, if we had all continuously repeated 'two and two still make four,'
much of the evil might have been averted." (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). While the Forbes'
quotation familiarly and eerily praised the accomplishments of the 1920's economy,
Baruch's words admonished the misguided efforts of the times, which ignored the
15

established economic principles and ultimately resulted in a long period of economic
hardship.

Discussion Summary
This discussion first demonstrated how business terminology has evolved as a result
of the Internet. It then clarified some of that terminology and examined other technological
advances that have impacted today's economy. The discussion then demonstrated that there
is no definitive proof that the post-Internet economy is fundamentally different than the preIntemet economy. An analysis of the differences in how the output growth rates interacted
with unemployment rates and inflation rates illustrated this point.
History had the final say in the discussion. It warned of the dangerous consequences
posed by mistaking technological advancement for a "new" economy. Considering the
volatility of the stock market and the economy's performance in recent months, it appears
that the words of Bernard Baruch are still true today. This paper, then, will refrain from
referring to today's economy as "new."

16

Traditional Business Principles
Traditional business principles are both broad and complex. Businesses look for
shortcuts and loopholes so that they might avoid the minute details involved with traditional
business principles and still succeed. As the hype and perceived urgencies of the "new"
economy began to build, that is exactly what many Internet-based businesses tried to do. In
early 2000 though, observers began to see what they could hardly imagine. Confidence in the
"new" economy, which had been the basis of circumventing traditional business principles,
began to wane.
Michael Ross, of underwear retailer Easyshop.com argued, "Companies must be built
on fundamentally sound traditional business principles." {Internet Magazine, 2000). Though
intimidating to a new breed of entrepreneur, traditional business principles must be applied.
Perhaps this discussion can eliminate the intimidation factor by reducing all of the rhetoric
and reasoning for business failures today into one definitive statement; The primary reason
for Internet-based business failure in today's economy has been the inability of these
businesses to proHtably provide a valuable product or service to their customers. This
statement is made after reviewing dozens of companies that have either made a desperate
attempt to slash their costs or have recently gone out of business (See Appendix A).
This section will focus on the steps a business must take in order to become
profitable. This requires a strategy based on traditional business principles, which will be
examined in some detail throughout this discussion. The manner in which the business
principles have evolved as a result of the Internet will also be examined. The discussion
begins, however, by looking at the relationship between strategy and profit.

17

Strategy And Profit
Strategy is defined as an action a company takes to attain one or more of its goals
(Hill & Jones, 1997). For most, if not all organizations, an overriding goal is to achieve
superior performance. Thus, a strategy can be defined more precisely as an action a company
takes to attain superior performance (Hill & Jones, 1997). For the sake of this discussion
performance is measured in profit, while superior performance is reflected in sustained profit.
Profit is defined as the excess of the selling price over all costs and expenses incurred
in making a sale (Bangs, 1998). Profitability can then be defined as the ability to make a
profit. So how does a business make a profit? The answer to that question lies in the way
businesses are developing and implementing profit-oriented strategies. Before strategy
development and implementation is addressed, a discussion of how profit relates to value is
appropriate.

Value And Profit
Value is what customers are willing to pay for a company's products or services
(Besanko, 1996). However, the actual sales price of a company's products or services is
usually below its perceived value. The difference in the perceived value of a company's
product or service and its sales price is what economists call a consumer surplus (Besanko,
1996).
Consumer Surplus = Perceived Value - Sales Price
The consumer surplus varies depending upon the competitive nature of the market. Also, the
abundance of information about prices, competitors, and features that is readily accessible on
the Internet has led to increasing cost transparency and consequently, to a decrease in
consumer surpluses (Sinha, 2000).
18

A company's profit lies in the difference between the sales price of its product or
service and the production cost of its product and service (Besanko, 1996).
Profit = Sales Price - Production Cost
Traditionally, the higher the value a customer places on a company's products or services,
the higher the sales price a company can apply. Higher sales prices, provided production
costs remain constant, result in a company earning higher profits. Additionally, a business
could improve its profit by lowering its production costs (Besanko, 1996).' This can be
mathematically deduced from the formula above.
Formulas such as these can make the relationship between profit and value confusing.
Though most businesses need only to remember that increasing sales prices or decreasing
production costs can lead to increased profits, which is, after all, the objective of this strategy
(See Exhibit B). Whether or not this particular objective is met depends on how the concepts
below are used in the development of the business model.

Strategy Development And Implementation
One of the most common principles used by today's successful companies, whether it
is a traditional brick and mortar store like Wal-Mart or an e-commerce trendsetter like Dell
Computers, is the development and implementation of a well-defined strategy. This
discussion begins by examining the steps necessary to formulate and implement an effective
strategy and then isolates some of the concepts involved in that process.
The basic model for developing and implementing a strategy is a five-step process: 1)
Election of the corporate mission and major corporate goals, 2) Analysis of the
' The statements regarding the increase in profit that result from higher perceived value or lower production
costs are contingent upon the sales price of a company's products or services being greater than their production
cost.

19

organization's external competitive environment to identify opportunities and threats, 3)
Analysis of the organization's internal operating environment to identify the organization's
strengths and weaknesses, 4) Selection of strategies that build on the organization's strengths
and correct its weaknesses in order to take advantage of external opportunities and counter
external threats, and 5) Strategy implementation (Hill & Jones, 1997).
As stated, the first step in strategy formulation is to establish a corporate mission and
subsequently define corporate goals. Since most companies want to improve their business'
overall level of performance, this discussion will focus on the goal of achieving profitability.
For instance, the overriding goal of Yahoo! is to achieve significant revenue and earnings
growth. Because the company has such clear goals, it is able to formulate the strategic steps
necessary to meet its goals (Hill & Jones, 1997).
The Impact Of The Internet On Profit-Seeking Logic
In the past, profitability was directly linked to market share (Slywotzky & Morrison,
1997). Assuming the sales prices exceeded operating costs, the more units a particular
company could sell, the more profit it would make. As a result, companies focused on
building economies of scale, rather than on producing valuable products and services. The
focus of companies in today's economy has since shifted away from products and towards
customers.
Successful companies are not blindly focused on gaining market share, but rather on
gaining specific market share in the most profitable areas (Slywotzky & Morrison, 1997).
Traditional profit-seeking logic was 1) Gain market share and 2) Profitability will follow.
Today's profit-seeking logic is 1) What's most important to the customer, i.e. what do they
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value?, 2) Can a profit be made in providing value to customers?, and 3) How can market
share be gained in that profitable zone (Slywotzky & Morrison, 1997)? Once these questions
are answered, the strategy begins to take shape. Next, a company identifies external
opportunities or threats by examining its competitive advantage within its particular industry.
Competitive Advantage
A company is said to have gained a competitive advantage when its business' profit
margin is higher than the industry average (Hill & Jones, 1997). Yet, achieving a competitive
advantage is only part of the process. Sustaining a competitive advantage over a period of
time truly sets a company apart from its competitors.
Companies today should therefore be seeking to establish a competitive advantage
and develop an on-going plan to sustain it. For example, Wal-Mart has had a sustained
competitive advantage for over 20 years. Its competitive advantage has been based on
efficient logistics, high employee productivity, and excellent customer service (Hill & Jones,
1997). Wal-Mart's willingness to integrate new efficiency-improvement technologies into its
business has allowed it to sustain its competitive advantage.
Wal-Mart's ability to maintain its competitive advantage helped the company thrive
in the early 1990's, when its competitors were struggling to keep their profits on par with the
industry average (Hill & Jones, 1997). The concepts on which Wal-Mart's competitive
advantage is founded are examined below.
The Generic Building Blocks Of Competitive Advantage
This concept is based on the premise that companies can use basic building blocks to
establish a competitive advantage. Traditionally there have been four building blocks:
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efficiency, quality, innovation, and customer responsiveness (Hill & Jones, 1997). Each
building block can be used to either create value, decrease production costs, or both.
Although these items are discussed individually, they are all interrelated.
Efficiency
Efficiency is the first element examined and in general terms, it can lead to a
competitive advantage by driving down costs. If the process involved in transforming inputs
into outputs becomes more efficient, the production costs can be driven down and a
competitive advantage gained. Efficiency is equal to outputs divided by inputs (Hill & Jones,
1997). Therefore, the more outputs a business can produce from a given set of inputs, the
more efficient the business. In other words, if Company A can take ten pounds of raw
material and produce 50 widgets and Company B can take ten pounds of raw material and
produce 55 widgets. Company B operates more efficiently.
Oualitv
Quality products are goods and services that are reliable in the sense that they
accomplish what they were designed for and do it well (Hill & Jones, 1997). If the processes
involved in transforming inputs into outputs are examined from a quality standpoint,
measures can be taken to assure the outputs that result are of high quality. Continuing with
the widget example, if Company B uses higher quality raw materials and employs more
qualified employees than does Company A, it stands to reason that the widgets produced by
Company B will be higher in quality than the widgets produced by Company A. Company B
can subsequently charge a higher price to offset the production costs of the higher quality
widgets. Furthermore, lower production costs can be attained if the quality inputs used by
Company B reduce the number of defective widgets that would otherwise be produced. Both
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of these scenarios, higher sales prices and lower production costs, would increase profits (See
Exhibit C).
Innovation
Innovation, the third building block, is defined as anything new or novel about the
way a company operates or the outputs it produces (Hill & Jones, 1997). Innovation has
always been involved when production processes are refined or new products and services
are created. If Company B, then, refined the process of producing widgets; it could lower its
costs and increase profits. If the company developed a newer widget that its customers
valued more, it could raise the sales price and increase profits. Both examples result in
Company B strengthening its competitive advantage over Company A.
Customer Responsiveness
The last traditional building block, but certainly not the least, is that of customer
responsiveness. As previously mentioned, the accessibility of knowledge in the market place
and the ease with which it can be attained has contributed to increasingly transparent costs.
Gone are the days when companies could set sales prices drastically higher than production
costs (Sinha, 2000). Because sales price is no longer the differentiating force that it once was,
the intangible qualities that profits depend on now lie in the realm of customer
responsiveness.
To demonstrate. Company B may no longer be able to sustain its competitive
advantage over Company A because it may no longer be able to charge a significantly higher
price for its widgets simply because they are higher quality. This would pose a serious
problem for Company B because it uses higher quality materials and provides its employees
with more training than does Company A, thus its production costs are relatively higher.
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Therefore, in addition to providing a higher quality widget, Company B can also use superior
customer responsiveness to increase the perceived value of its widgets. The company could
then continue to demand a higher sales price and offset the expenses attributed to the higher
level of customer responsiveness. This is especially important if Company B intends to
sustain its competitive advantage.
Again, note that the four building blocks are interrelated. The ability of Company B
to integrate the efficiency, quality, innovation, and customer responsiveness building blocks
could lead to lower unit costs and higher unit prices (See Exhibit D). A significant
competitive advantage over Company A would be gained as a result.
On the other hand, suppose that despite all Company B has done to gain a competitive
advantage, customers still prefer doing business with Company A. Why? It is possible that
the four traditional building blocks are not enough to ensure a competitive advantage in
today's economy. This discussion proposes that two additional building blocks must be taken
into consideration for a business in today's economy to establish and sustain a competitive
advantage. The two new building blocks are: lock-in and complementarities.
Lock-In
Lock-in refers to the ability of a business to attract repeat customers. It can result by
establishing switching costs that customers face if they were to switch to a different provider
(Amit & Zott, 2000). If a customer perceives a switching cost, then a company can increase
prices for the products or services it sells. On the Internet, switching costs are created by
providing transaction safety and creating the perception of trust, through familiarity with the
site, and also through customization and personalization. One simple example of a company
that uses lock-in effectively is Amazon.com. Amazon has developed features like its "one24

click ordering system" that make it easier for customers to complete e-commerce transactions
{Marketing News, 2000). This ease of use, as well as Amazon's ability to personalize its
website to better meet its customers' needs, effectively locks-in buyers who return for more
purchases.
Complementarities
The second new building block is that of complementarities. Companies have long
known that they can leverage the value of their own products by bundling them with
complementary products from other suppliers. On the Internet, bundling complementary
products or services together is crucial because it helps to establish and sustain a competitive
advantage (Amit & Zott, 2000). For instance, if Company B markets its e-widgets with
Company C's e-widget accessory services, the combined value of the two products could be
greater than the value of the individual products alone. The higher combined value which
results allows for increased sales prices.
These additional building blocks can help make the traditional generic building
blocks more applicable in today's economy. Furthermore, businesses today should note that
all of the building blocks discussed are generic and thus general in nature. As is discussed
later in this section, well-defined strategies are necessary for companies to succeed.
Up to this point in the strategic planning process, the focus has been external. Ways
in which a company can gauge its position in the market and improve customers' perception
have been considered. The next stage of the strategy development process involves looking
inside a company's organization and identifying the processes involved in delivering value to
customers.
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The Value Chain
The term value chain refers to a company's chain of activities that transform inputs
into outputs that customers consider valuable (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997). This is a
strategic concept that businesses can use to further establish or develop their competitive
advantage and to maximize profit. Traditionally the value chain begins with the company's
core competencies and its assets. It then moves to inputs and other raw materials, to a product
or an offering, to the distribution channels, and finally to the customer (See Exhibit E). The
Internet is challenging the traditional application of this process, which results from the
"product first and customer second" mode of thinking, which is referred to as product-centric
thinking (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997).
The Internet has shifted the balance of power away from businesses and towards
customers. This fundamental shift has altered the way in which the value chain concept
might be used today. Rather than starting with a company's core competencies and working
towards delivering a product or service to a customer, it is more relevant to start with
customers' needs and work backwards toward a company's core competencies. The
"customer first and product second" mode of thinking is referred to as customer-centric
thinking (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997). A comparison of the product-centric value chain
and customer-centric value chain is illustrated in Exhibit E.
Customer-Centric Thinking
This discussion does not infer that the value chain concept is irrelevant in today's
economy. On the contrary, the value chain is a powerful tool, though this discussion argues
that it be viewed in a customer-centric light. Consider customer-centric thinking as a way of
focusing on the future and not on the past. It involves deciphering what a customer's top two
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or three priorities are likely to be and then designing a product or service with those specific
priorities in mind (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997).
Clearly, if a product is developed specifically with a customer group's needs in mind,
those customers will value that product more and be willing to pay more to acquire it. If
Company B designed a customer-centric product it would have a definite advantage over
Company A. Furthermore, if customers value Company B's product more than Company A's
product. Company B could assign a higher sales price to its product. This would increase
Company B's profit and thus establish a competitive advantage over Company A.
Up to this point in the strategic planning process, an objective has been set, desirable
markets and customers have been identified, competitive advantages in those markets have
been addressed, and the processes involved in delivering value to desirable customers have
been defined. At this point in the development process, a company is ready to focus on its
business model.

The Business Model
As has been discussed throughout this paper, the underlying premise of the traditional
business principles is the same. However, the ways in which fundamental business concepts
are applied has evolved since the advent of the Internet. The business model is one such
concept. A business model can be defined as all of the Internet- and non-Intemet-related
processes involved in delivering value to a customer (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). Although it is
part of the business model, revenue generation is a model in itself. The revenue model
refers to the specific ways in which a business model enables revenue generation.
To clarify, a business model describes the ways in which a company interacts with its
partners, suppliers, and employees to create value for its customers. A revenue model centers
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on the methods in which revenues can be realized, such as subscription fees, advertising fees,
or e-commerce transactions. The revenue model and its relationship with a business model's
cost structure are now examined.
The Revenue Model And The Cost Structure
Before an effective revenue model can be designed, an understanding of the existing
cost structure is necessary. After all, if the costs of producing a particular product are
unknown, how can an efficient revenue model be developed? Fortunately the strategy
development portion of this process can provide some insight.
In order to accurately define the cost structure, the cost of each process included in
the business model must be determined. Accurately allocating costs to those processes is not
an easy task. While it is fairly simple to assign a cost to raw materials or direct labor, precise
costing of a process like research and development or marketing is more challenging.
Costs indirectly associated with a production unit are called overhead costs
(Zimmerman, 1999). A variety of overhead allocation methods can be used; however, those
methods are beyond the scope of this paper. Generally speaking overhead allocation methods
allow a business to account for all costs on a per unit basis. Analyzing the existing cost
structure and viewing it in a cost per process manner can provide a company with a deeper
understanding of its business model.
Once production costs are accurately gauged, then and only then can an accurate
pricing decision be made. APBNews is a good example of a company whose business model
was adept at producing valuable content, but whose revenue model was inept at producing
sufficient revenue. Had the executives at APBNews taken the time to examine their internal
28

processes and the costs involved in producing their content, they could have either taken a
slower growth strategy or aggressively refined their revenue model to offset their
expenditures.
The process of defining a company's cost structure also helps establish a floor, or a
lower limit for the price a company should charge for its product or service. Conversely,
market conditions, along with price transparency and other issues, help determine the ceiling,
or the upper limit. These are crucial pieces of information when developing a revenue model.
If the business processes are accurately defined and costs are assigned accordingly,
the revenue model is likely to be far more effective. An effective revenue model combined
with the concepts previously discussed in this section will result in a truly solid business
model that does two things: 1) Provides customers a valuable product or service and 2)
Provides business owner(s) revenues that are likely to exceed productions costs. The
remainder of this section will examine how the Internet has influenced the processes
involved in developing a business model.
The Impact Of The Internet On Business Models
Three basic strategies for structuring business models to create superior value exist:
1) Differentiation - a business model is structured in such a way that it produces a product or
service that consumers value more and are prepared to pay a premium price for, 2) Low-cost
leader - a business model is structured to drive down the production costs and produce a
product or service priced below its competition, and 3) A combination of the two strategies
(Porter, 1985). Before selecting a strategy, it may be useful for companies to identify the
major components of their current and future business models and identify how the Internet
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is likely to impact each component. Several business model components, along with
questions that address the impact of the Internet on those components, are considered in the
table below.
Table 1 - The Impact of the Internet on Business Model Components
Component
-« .
of Business
, ,
Model

4.
Questions for
,
All Business Models

Questions Specific to
Internet Business Models

Generic
strategy

Is the firm offering its customers
something distinctive or at a lower cost
than its competitors?

What is it about the Internet that allows a
firm to offer its customers something
distinctive? Can the Internet allow a firm to
solve a new set of problems for customers?

Desirable
customers

To which customers (demographic and
geographic) is the firm offering this value?
What is the range of products/services
offered that embody this value?

What is the scope of customers that the
Internet enables a firm to reach? Does the
Internet alter the product or service mix that
embodies the firm's products?

Pricing decision

How does the firm price the value?

How does the Internet make pricing
different?

Revenue model

Where do the dollars come from? Who
pays for what value and when? What are
the margins in each market and what
drives them? What drives value in each
source?

Are revenue sources different with the
Internet? What is new?

Internet and
non-Internet
related
activities

What set of activities does the firm have to
perform to offer this value and when? How
connected (in cross-section and time) are
these activities?

How many new activities must be
performed because of the Internet? How
much better can the Internet help a firm to
perform existing activities?

Implementation

What organizational structure, systems,
people, and environment does the firm
need to carry out these activities? What is
the fit between them?

What does the Internet do to the strategy,
structure, systems, people, and environment
of a firm?

Sustainability

What is it about the firm that makes it
difficult for other firms to imitate it? How
does the firm keep making money? How
does the firm sustain its competitive
advantage?

Does the Internet make sustainability easier
or more difficult? How can a firm take
advantage of it?

Source: Afuah, Allan & Tucci, Christopher L. (2000). Internet Business Models and Strategies. New York:
McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

Key Characteristics Of Internet Business Models
In order for business models to be just as beneficial in today's dynamic economy as
they were in the past, it is recommended that they include three key characteristics: 1)
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Scalability, 2) Complementary resources and capabilities, and 3) Knowledge-sharing routines
(Ethiraj, 2000).
Scalability
Scalability can be defined as how well a solution to some problem will work when a
variable of that problem - demand for example - increases (Hill & Jones, 1997). Business
models in today's economy must be scalable to respond to such changes in the technological
environment in which they operate. Because they were scalable, companies like Yahoo! and
e-Bay were able to innovatively leverage their first mover advantage and quickly capture a
dominant share of their respective markets. The scalability of those companies' business
models enabled them to exploit opportunities offered by the Web. If companies want the
ability to exploit Internet-related opportunities as Yahoo! and e-Bay did, they must develop
business models that are scalable.
Complementary Resources And Capabilities
As previously mentioned, a company with an innovative business model can initially
use its technological superiority to establish a competitive advantage. It is a mistake,
however, to believe that a technological advantage in today's business environment is a longterm proposition. Technological innovation, which dominates the e-business world, has a
unique attribute. It is generally difficult to produce in the first place, but once produced, it is
comparatively easy to reproduce (Ethiraj, 2000).
This attribute sharply lowers technological barriers to entry and allows rivals to catch
up with first movers in a relatively short period of time. Yahoo! is a good example of this.
Although Yahoo! was the first portal to market, there were no real barriers to entry so
competitors like AltaVista.com and Excite.com quickly followed suit. Yahoo! had to develop
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and acquire additional complementary resources and services to sustain its first mover
advantage. Had Yahoo! not had that capability it would almost surely not be as popular as it
is today.
Knowledge-Sharing Routines
Whether it is Microsoft or America On-Line, no individual firm can dominate the
Internet. In fact, the Internet's open architectural design was specifically created to avoid
such dominance. As a result, networks of alliances have become increasingly important.
Businesses today must recognize that competitive advantage in the post-Intemet economy is
often based on effectively managing collaborative relationships with key partners, like
suppliers or distributors. Thus the need for strong collaborative relationships arises. These
cooperative relationships can only become truly effective if the collaborators develop
mechanisms through which they can mutually share knowledge. Such knowledge-sharing
relationships will enhance the participating businesses' collective competitive advantage.
The elements of scalability, complementary resources and capabilities, and
knowledge-sharing routines are not necessarily new. Yet, their degree of importance to the
success of a business model is. Companies operating in today's economy can strengthen their
competitive advantages by incorporating these characteristics into their business models.

Discussion Summary
The primary focus of this section was developing a strategy based on traditional
business principles that results in a fundamentally sound business model. Concepts involved
in the development and implementation process were examined throughout the discussion.
Effects of the Internet on the application of these concepts were also analyzed. Value's
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relationships to strategy and profit served as the foundation for developing and implementing
the strategy.
The five-step process that followed that analysis served as the framework for the
remainder of the discussion. The model illustrated in Exhibit F is based on the five steps of
that process. The first stage of the model is that of clarification. In this stage a company
narrows the focus of its potential business model by defining specific goals. The way in
which the Internet has affected the process of identifying markets and customers was
addressed in that portion of the discussion. As the company focuses externally on
competitive markets, and especially on potential customers it hopes to serve, the model
transitions into its second phase.
In stage two, a company focuses on the external opportunities and threats that exist
for its business. The generic building blocks of competitive advantage used in that discussion
evaluate a company's position within its marketplace. They also further establish the
direction of the company. Additionally, two new building blocks - lock-in and
complementarities - were proposed. For a company to gauge its market position it must have
a good understanding of its internal business processes. The need for an internal analysis
leads to stage three.
In stage three, internal focus, business processes and their interdependent
relationships are defined. The value chain concept was used to facilitate the internal analysis.
Customer-centric thinking was introduced and the vantage point of the traditional value chain
challenged.
As a result of the new vantage point, it was argued that a company could better
identify and assign costs to both value producing and non-value producing business
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processes. This results in a well-defined cost structure, which was identified as being an
integral part of a solid business model. The appreciation gained through using the value chain
to identify business processes and then to allocate costs provides invaluable insights that
carry over into stages four and five of the model.
In stage four, the new business model is conceptually constructed. Business processes
are theoretically adapted to maximize value-producing efforts and to minimize costs. In an
effort to drive down costs, value-producing business processes can be refined, while nonvalue-producing business processes can be phased out wherever possible. The well-defined
cost structure will facilitate the development of a truly efficient revenue model. After all, a
well-defined cost structure and an efficient revenue model, combined with the previous
concepts covered throughout this discussion, will result in a truly solid business model. Stage
five then involves identifying and implementing the changes necessary to bring the existing
business model in line with the conceptual business model.
Finally, although the model is divided and ordered into five succinct stages, the
model is actually perpetual. In today's dynamic economy, the only thing that is constant is
change. As such, all companies must be willing to adapt their businesses to the changes they
will inevitably face.
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Traditional Business Principles Applied In Today's Economy
This discussion will look at how the traditional business principles have been used by
one of the most recognizable companies today - Priceline.com. The discussion begins by
looking at the history of Priceline and then defining the company, as it exists today, by
examining likely causes for its recent decline. Finally, the model for strategy development
and implementation will be applied to the context of Priceline's evolution. It should be noted
the Priceline discussion in this section is retrospective and based on secondary data. The
intent was to illustrate the conceptual model in a specific context rather than to suggest either
effective or ineffective management on the part of Priceline.

The History Of Priceline.Com
Jay Walker founded Priceline.com on July 18,1997. The company was based on a
concept developed and patented by Walker Digital Inc. known as the "demand collection
system" (Priceline, 2000). The demand collection system is detailed later.
Priceline launched its website on April 6,1998 with its first service, airline ticket
reservations and the following October expanded to include hotel rooms (Priceline, 2000). In
January of 1999, Priceline underwent horizontal integration of its services when it began
offering customers a mortgage-bidding service (Priceline, 2000). Thus, Priceline entered the
financial services industry. Priceline went public on March 30,1999 and used the $160
million it raised to further horizontal integration into other industries (Priceline, 2(X)0). The
following July the company teamed up with AutoNation Inc. to offer an Internet car-buying
service (Priceline, 2000).
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In the fall of 1999, a portion of Priceline's capital was invested in another Walkerfounded company, Priceline WebHouse Club. The demand collection system was licensed to
Priceline WebHouse for the sale of groceries and the new company was incorporated directly
into Priceline's website. Later that fall Priceline expanded into yet another industry with the
addition of international and domestic long distance phone service (Priceline, 2000).
The announcements kept coming the following year and in February 2000, rental car
reservations were added to Priceline's list of offerings. In June, while gasoline prices were
soaring, Priceline WebHouse announced that it would allow users to name their own price on
gasoline. At its peak, a customer visiting Priceline.com could "name their own price" on
plane tickets, hotel rooms, rental cars, domestic and international long distance service, home
financing, groceries, new and used cars, and finally gasoline. Gasoline, however, proved to
be the last major addition for Priceline.
In September 2000, Priceline warned that its third quarter earnings would be in the
range of $340 million to $345 million, significantly lower than analysts' estimates of $360
million to $380 million (Priceline, 2000). Later that October, Priceline WebHouse announced
plans to wind down operations over the next 90 days and immediately lay off 40 of its 425
member staff (See Exhibit G). Remaining employees were to be let go during the following
months (Fendelman, 2000). Priceline WebHouse officials said that they would not be able to
raise a third round of financing required to complete the business plan and achieve
profitability (Fendelman, 2000).
That announcement had a particularly negative effect on Priceline because it recorded
a $189 million non-cash gain in the fourth quarter of 1999 from a warrant it received in
Priceline WebHouse. As a result of the closure, Priceline was forced to take a non-cash loss
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Table 2 - Timeline of Events in the History of Priceline.com
7/18/1997.. . Priceline is founded
4/6/1998.. . Priceline launched its website with its first service, airline ticket reservations
8/27/1998.. . Richard S. Braddock is named Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
10/28/1998.. . Hotel rooms reservations are added to Priceline's offerings
1/25/1999.. . Priceline entered the home finance industry and provided its customers the opportunity to
name their own rate and terms for mortgages
3/29/1999.. . Priceline priced IPO at $16 per share went public the following day
6/17/1999.. . Daniel H. Schulman, former President of AT&T's Consumer Markets Division, is named as
Priceline's new President and Chief Operating Officer
7/1/1999.. . Maryann Keller is named President of Priceline's Automotive Services Unit
7/27/1999.. . Priceline and AutoNation, Inc. announced their plans to offer a name-your-own-price new
vehicle service
11/1/1999.. . Priceline WebHouse Club's website is launched
11/8/1999 . . Priceline entered the telecommunications industry by expanding its business offerings to
include International and Domestic Long Distance Service
2/3/2000.. . Priceline expanded its offerings to allow its users to name their own price for car rental
reservations
2/23/2000.. . Heidi Miller, Former CFO of Citigroup, joined Priceline.com as its Senior Executive Vice
President, CFO and Member of the Board Of Directors
4/4/2000.. . William F. Pike joined Priceline as Vice President in charge of Financial Planning &
Analysis and Investor Relations
6/20/2000.. . Priceline announced the addition of gasoline to WebHouse Club
10/5/2000.. . Priceline WebHouse Club announced the 90-day wind-down of its name-your-price grocery
and gasoline Internet service
11/1/2000.. . Priceline announced plans to layoff approximately 87 employees
11/8/2000.. . Heidi Miller and Maryann Keller leave Priceline after the layoffs were announced, stock
price fell 23 percent on the report of the executives departures
12/7/2000.. . Priceline.com eliminated approximately 11 percent of its workforce
12/28/2000.. . Jay Walker stepped down from Priceline's Board of Directors
Source: Priceline.com Press Releases
http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhttnl?ticker=pcln&script=400

for the full $189 million carrying value of the warrant in the third-quarter of 2000
(Fendelman, 2000). This did not sit well with investors and its already falling stock price
continued to plunge. As profitability became a more pressing issue in the minds of investors,
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the viability of Priceline's demand collection system was called into question. In an effort to
make Priceline profitable, considerable steps were taken to reduce expenditures.
Early in November 2000, Priceline announced plans to lay off 87 of its 535
employees (Priceline, 2000). This led to more setbacks later that month when two Priceline
executives left as a result of the cutbacks. Maryann Keller, who headed Priceline's autoservices business, left the company after she was asked to lay off half of her 23-person staff
(Loomis, 2000). When asked about her departure, she publicly declared Priceline's on-line
car buying venture a failure (Anqwin & Lundegaard, 2000). That same week Chief Financial
Officer Heidi Miller also left, though her reasons for leaving were not disclosed (Krebs,
2000).
The layoffs and departures continued to have a detrimental effect on Priceline's stock
price. On November 13, 2000, just eight months after reaching a record high of $106.63 per
share, its stock price fell to an all-time low of $2.13 per share (The Wall Street Journal,
2000). The table on the previous page summarizes these events. The next portion of this
discussion will hypothesize on possible reasons for Priceline's diminishing market value.

Possible Reasons For Priceline's Current Status
Priceline's diminishing value can be attributed to two likely reasons: 1) Making
Priceline successful is not Jay Walker's primary objective and 2) The demand collection
system on which Priceline is founded is not efficient. The statement involving Mr. Walker's
objectives is examined first.
Priceline does not provide a publicly disclosed mission statement. As such, no clear
company objectives can be identified. From an outsider's point of view, however, one might
ascertain from the number of horizontal expansions made by Priceline that its primary
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unofficial objective has been to expand into as many markets as possible. A likely reason for
the seemingly indiscriminate expansion of Priceline is the fact that Jay Walker has more of a
vested interest in the success of the demand collection system than he does in Priceline itself.
This is because Walker Digital, Inc. holds the patent rights to the pricing system used
by Priceline. Consequently, the more markets the demand collection system is viable in, the
more valuable the patent becomes for Walker Digital, Inc. So it seems that instead of Mr.
Walker using the demand collection system to make Priceline successful, just the opposite
holds true. The possibility that the success of Priceline was a secondary concern for Mr.
Walker would contribute to its present status.
The second likely reason for the present status of Priceline is the inefficient nature of
the demand collection system, used in some form or another to sell all of Priceline's services.
Technologically speaking the processes that make up Priceline's pricing system are rather
complex, although the concept is quite simple. Since the majority of Priceline's revenues
come from the sale of airline tickets, they will be used to illustrate how the system actually
works.
The process actually began when Priceline negotiated with participating carriers for
access to unsold seats at special prices. Unfortunately for Priceline, Mr. Walker did not have
a great deal of leverage during early negotiations. As a result, Priceline is limited to the
tickets and the prices the airlines decide upon. Also, the tickets provided by the airlines are
generally for seats they would not be able to sell otherwise.
Once the pool of tickets is assigned to Priceline the ticket prices, which the airlines
(not Priceline) may revise as often as they like, are entered into a database. When a bid is
submitted, computers check whether a match is available and the bidder is notified via e-mail
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20 to 30 minutes later with a response. This means that a bid is filled only if it meets or
exceeds a price that is previously set by one of Priceline's partner airlines. So while it is true
that consumers can "name" prices at Priceline, it is still the airlines that determine whether or
not those prices are acceptable. Also, Priceline does not publish the prices of its available
tickets and consumers tend to pay more than the undisclosed prices set by the airlines
(Elkind, 1999).
Still, the value that results from this business model lies in the customer's perception
of control, i.e. naming their own price. Although the number of concessions a customer must
make in order to do business with Priceline arguably diminishes that value. For instance, here
are just a.few of the concessions passengers must be willing to make in order to purchase a
ticket from Priceline. Customers must be willing to: 1) Fly any airline, 2) Depart at any time
after 6 a.m. and land anytime before 10 p.m., 3) Accept coach class seats that are not eligible
for frequent flier miles or upgrades, and 4) Agree that all accepted bids cannot be changed
and are non-refundable. So not only are customers not getting the lowest price available, they
are also forced to make concessions.
This turns out to be a fairly inefficient way of selling airline tickets. The ratio of
submitted bids to accepted bids attests to this fact. In 1999 only 24 percent of all the bids
submitted to Priceline were actually filled. As poor as that number sounds, it was an increase
of 17 percent over 1998's seven percent fill rate (Elkind, 1999). This means that in 1998
Priceline was unable to satisfy approximately 75 percent of the bids that were submitted.
Furthermore, it often takes several attempts before a bid is finally accepted because a specific
itinerary can usually be submitted only once. Recall that it takes 20 to 30 minutes before
customers know whether or not their bids were accepted, which can also make the process
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very time consuming. The next portion of this discussion focuses on how the strategy
development and implementation model introduced in the previous section could be applied
to Priceline's situation.

Application Of The Strategy Development And Implementation Model
Stage One - Clarification
As previously stated, Priceline does not have a publicized mission statement or a list
of strategic objectives. That is not to say that one does not exist; however, for this discussion
it is assumed that Priceline is in need of a clearly defined corporate goal. Although Priceline
may have many strategic objectives - for example to sell a certain number of tickets, to
improve its fulfillment rates, or to earn a profit - none qualify as a corporate goal. Within the
context of this model, corporate goals are long-term and specific.
For instance, if expansion were the corporate goal of a particular company, that
company v/ould likely focus on expanding into specific industries and markets in which it
has a core competence. Priceline, on the other hand, underwent significant horizontal
integration into industries in which it did not appear to have any obvious core competencies
or previous experience. In retrospect those expansions may not have been the most ideal for
Priceline. Unfortunately there is not an opportunity to examine the relevancy of those choices
in the context of a public mission statement or its subsequent goals. This relevance and the
importance of such goals are examined next.
If one viewed Priceline as a giant ocean-going ship, it would be easy to see the need
for forward thinking and specificity. Ships that size cannot be maneuvered very easily, nor
can they sail aimlessly for an indefinite period of time. Before setting sail, they first need a
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specific destination so that the best course can be plotted, the appropriate personnel hired,
and the necessary supplies brought aboard.
Just as a ship's destination cannot be vague, neither can a company's corporate goal.
Therefore, while becoming profitable is an excellent objective for Priceline, it is not a
suitable corporate goal. In fact, solely focusing on profitability could be detrimental to
Priceline's long-term success. To avoid conflicts between short-term and long-term goals,
Priceline's specific corporate goal should be to maximize the current value per share of its
existing stock.
This goal is based on the assumption that investors purchase stock because they seek
to gain financially (Ross, 1996). Therefore a company's decision could be categorized as
either positive or negative based on the likely effect the decision would have on the
company's stock price. It follows that Priceline should act in its shareholders' best interests
by making decisions that increase the fundamental value of the company, which in turn
would increase the value of its stock. Specific strategic objectives that could have such an
effect on Priceline will be discussed in stage three. For now, the corporate goal has been
selected and the model transitions onto stage two.
Stage Two - External Focus
In stage two, one of external focus, a company first identifies its target markets and
ideal customers within those markets. To continue with the ship example, a decision needs to
be made as to what cargo will be carried. After all, a ship designed to carry freight is much
different than a ship designed to carry people. Once the cargo is selected, further distinctions
must be made as to what type of freight or passengers the ship carries. The more information
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that can be attained before a ship sets sail, the more accommodating the ship can be for its
cargo.
For the sake of this discussion, Priceline should narrow the scope of its offerings to
services within the travel industry. Its ideal customers are price-conscious travelers who need
reservations and acconmiodations on short notice. Therefore, the ideal customers for
Priceline are business and leisure travelers seeking accommodations on short notice and at
bargain prices. Conversely, Priceline should not be actively seeking travelers who may have
airline, class, or frequent-flier preferences. With a target market identified and ideal
customers defined, it is important to determine how Priceline compares relative to its
competition.
Although Priceline was an early entrant in the on-line segment of the travel industry,
competitors quickly gained ground. In fact, later entrants have the benefit of learning from
their predecessors. For example, Hotwire.com, a recent entrant in the on-line travel market,
promises to deliver deep discounts just like Priceline does, only with a more user-friendly
system (Merrick, 2000).
Hotwire is an excellent example of a service designed in a customer-centric fashion.
This system takes much of the work out of the customers' hands. Instead of having to devise
and submit multiple itineraries, as Priceline.com requires, Hotwire.com requires an itinerary
be devised and submitted only once. Hotwire then takes the itinerary and provides a list of
available flights according to customer preferences with regard to specific airports, number
of connections, or lowest prices. Finally, the customer has 30 minutes to decide whether to
purchase one of the available tickets at the price listed by Hotwire (Merrick, 2000).

The customer-centric focus and the fact that Hotwire actually publishes its prices are
serious concerns for Priceline considering they share common sources of airline tickets. In
fact, many major airlines that supply Priceline are direct investors in Hotwire. This poses a
serious threat to Priceline's ability to sustain a competitive advantage, which is examined as
the model begins to transition onto the third stage of internal focus.
Stage Three - Internal Focus
A closer look at how Priceline is currently using the competitive advantage building
blocks can provide some insight as to what objectives might help Priceline improve upon its
position in the on-line travel market. For instance, the demand collection system on which
Priceline is founded is still relatively innovative. In fact, allowing consumers to "name their
own price" may be one of the most important sources of Priceline's competitive advantage.
The innovation building block could be considered strong as a result.
Priceline has further developed its competitive advantage by strengthening the lock-in
building block. Much like Amazon, Priceline allows users to create a profile that tracks the
areas visited and the purchases made by each user. It then uses that information to make
customized recommendations the next time that user visits Priceline.com.
Priceline also offers a variety of services that complement its airline-ticket offerings.
The ability of travelers to make hotel and car rental reservations when they make airline
reservations strengthens the complementarities building block. However, some of the
services offered by Priceline add no value to its core travel-related services. Because these
non-value adding services consume valuable resources, they diminish the strength of this
building block and the overall competitive advantage of the company.
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Unfortunately the quality of the services offered by Priceline could be considered low
- so low that more than 300 complaints have been filed against Priceline with The
Connecticut Better Business Bureau and government regulatory agencies since 1998 (Schaal,
2000). In September 2000, the bureau rescinded Priceline's membership because of the
numerous complaints filed against the company; though the company has since been
reinstated (Schaal, 2000). Numerous complaints, along with the low percentage of bids
actually filled by Priceline, are indicators that Priceline's quality, efficiency, and customer
responsiveness building blocks are weak.
The competitive advantage building blocks provide the necessary insight to
approximate Priceline's position in the market. To further enhance this insight and move
closer to its goal of maximizing the value of its stock, Priceline needs a better understanding
of how its internal processes interrelate with the competitive advantage building blocks.
After all, improving the quality and efficiency of its internal processes would drive down
costs and, if done correctly, could help to increase the percentage of completed bids and
value delivered to its customers. In fact, these objectives are becoming more and more
important as competition in the on-line travel market increases.
In January 2001 Expedia and Travelocity announced improvements to their on-line
services (Davis, 2001). Expedia rolled out "Expert Searching and Pricing," a new platform
the company says will allow its customers to choose from an average of 400 itinerary
combinations for each round-trip domestic air ticket search. Travelocity's new fare-search
technology will show consumers when to travel to get the lowest airfare. The fact that both
companies made their announcements on the same day illustrates the competitive nature of
the on-line travel market and the importance of providing ever-increasing value to customers.
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Driving down costs and increasing sales volumes are two ways in which Priceline is
most likely to achieve its corporate goal of maximizing the value of its stock. Recall that
raising or lowering its prices are not options for Priceline because its suppliers determine the
price floor and its customers determine the price ceiling. Therefore if Priceline wants to
meets its goal and also become profitable it must focus internally on two strategic objectives:
1) Improving the quality and efficiency of the demand collection system and 2) Streamlining
the cost structure.
Accomplishing these two objectives can be aided through the use of the value chain
concepts (See Exhibit E). These concepts can be used to identify the processes that make up
Priceline's current business model. Once identified, each process must be further reduced to
specific activities, examined, and then defined. The definition should establish whether a
process contributes value and quantify the costs it consumes.
Determining whether a particular process produces value and gauging its cost are
tedious tasks. The effort required, however, should not deter Priceline, or any company for
that matter, from clearly defining its business processes. The definitions provide insight into
the efficiency and the necessity of individual business processes, which are vital pieces of
information in stage four, construction.
Stage Four - Construction
In this stage, information gathered from the three previous stages is used to
theoretically refine each business process and to construct a conceptual business model.
Priceline's processes need to be refined to produce the most value and consume the fewest
resources possible. Care must be taken to assure the two objectives discussed in stage three
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are adequately addressed and that Priceline is closer to its ultimate goal as a result of the
changes.
This stage is also a tedious one because it involves identifying specific activities
within specific business processes that can be either improved upon or eliminated altogether.
The end result of this stage is the ideal business model for Priceline based upon the decisions
made and information gathered in the three previous stages. The next stage involves
implementing the necessary changes.
Stage Five - Implementation
The objective of stage five is to minimize the differences between the ideal business
model and the existing business model. When an implementation plan is developed, care
must be taken so that employee or consumer confidence is not affected in a negative way.
Employees could resist the changes being made or consumers could consider the product or
service less valuable if the plan is not implemented in a thoughtful manner.
In Priceline's case the implementation plan would almost certainly involve modifying
certain processes, eliminating some of its services, and ultimately further reducing its
workforce. Changes like these have the potential to make Priceline appear to be in a worse
situation than it actually is. Consequently, internal and external reactions should be
thoroughly considered when the implementation plan is developed and carefully monitored
when the existing business model is brought in line with the conceptual business model.
Comments About The Strategy Development And Implementation Model
The perpetual nature of this model requires that Priceline continually progress
through the five stages of the model. This means that once Priceline implements the changes
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necessary to bring its current business model in line with its ideal business model, it must
begin anew to reevaluate its corporate goals and strategic objectives. Priceline must make
sure the direction of the company coincides with current market conditions if it hopes to
sustain its competitive advantage. This will undoubtedly result in Priceline perpetually
refining its business model to assure continual movement towards its corporate goal.

CheapTickets And Priceline.Com
To further demonstrate how a closer adherence to traditional business principles
would benefit Priceline, this section of the discussion compares Priceline's performance with
that of a competitor who has adhered to traditional business principles. The competitor for
this analysis is CheapTickets, which was co-founded in 1986 by Chairman Michael Hartley
and his wife (Elkind, 1999). The company sells airline tickets primarily by phone and on the
Internet, as well as through its 12 retail outlets. Thus, CheapTickets is not an Internet pure
player. Despite this fact, CheapTickets strives to serve many of the same customers as
Priceline and is subject to the same economic and market conditions. For the purposes of this
discussion, these factors make CheapTickets suitable for comparison.
Even though CheapTickets was established nearly 12 years before Priceline, it is not
nearly as well known. The reason for its relative obscurity is because Mr. Hartley specifically
chose not to invest in developing his brand as Mr. Walker did. CheapTickets was committed
to earning a profit, but could not afford to advertise like Priceline (Elkind, 1999). "My hat's
off to Jay [Walker]," said Mr. Hartley in a 1999 interview. "He's created a national brand in a
very short period. I think I could've done the same if I spent the money he did on advertising.
But then, we've got a policy here at CheapTickets: We need to make money." (Elkind, 1999).
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Over time, the decision not to invest heavily in brand development was profitable for
CheapTickets. In 1999 it racked up a comparable number of airline tickets sales and
generated comparable revenues (See Table Below). More importantly CheapTickets reported
a net income of $7.6 million for the fiscal year ending 1999 compared to Priceline's Net Loss
of $1,055 billion (See Table Below).

Table 3 - Financial Comparison of CheapTickets and Priceline
CheaoTickets, Inc.

Priceline.com, Inc.

NASDAQ: CTIX

NASDAQ: PC LN

Fiscal Year-End: December

Fiscal \ ear-End: December

1999 Sales (mil.): $339.6
1-Yr. Sales Growth: 98.5%

1999 Sales (mil.): $482.4
l-\ r. Sales (irowth: 1270.5%

2000 Sales (mil.): $98.4
l-Yr. Sales Growth: (71.07r)

2000 Sales (mil.): $1,235.0
1-^ r. Sales (irowth: 156.0%

1999 Net Inc. (mil.): $7.6
1-Yr. Net Inc. Cirowth: 590.9%

1999 Net Inc. (mil.): ($1,055.1)
\-\r. Net Inc. (irowth: N/A

2000 Net Inc. (mil.): $12.0
1-Yr. Net Inc. Growth: 57.97r

2000 Net Inc. (mil.): ($330.0)
l-\'r. Net Inc. Growth: N/A

1999 Employees: 953
1-Yr. Employee Growth: 61.5%

1999 Employees: 373
1-Yr. Employee Growth: 164.5%

Source: Hoover's On-line: http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/3/0,2163,59003,OO.html (CheapTickets)
http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/7/0,2163,58847,00.html (Priceline)

This paper argues that the drastically different bottom lines are a direct result of the
drastically different ways in which the two companies applied traditional business principles.
First and foremost, CheapTickets made making money a priority. Second, Mr. Hartley
understood the cost structure of CheapTickets in relation to its revenue model. This is evident
by examining the performance of the company over the last year. Despite its sales falling 71
percent in 2000, its net income actually increased 51 percent. This performance is a direct
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result of Mr. Hartley's understanding of the relationship between CheapTickets' revenue
model and its cost structure.
The fact that CheapTickets was founded in the pre-Intemet economy could have
something do with this understanding. The company began as a traditional brick and mortar
company at a time when adherence to traditional business principles was not considered to be
optional. As the Internet and the World Wide Web evolved, Mr. Hartley incorporated them
into his business by focusing on them as alternative distribution channels and marketing
mechanisms that could enhance CheapTickets' ability to attract new clients and better serve
existing ones. Had Mr. Hartley forsaken traditional business principles because of the
Internet and the World Wide Web, CheapTickets would almost certainly not be in business
today.

Discussion Summary
This discussion demonstrates that the principles responsible for making businesses
successful in the pre-Intemet economy are the same principles responsible for making
businesses successful in the post-Internet economy. Based on its history, it was evident that
Priceline fell victim to the "new" economy mode of thinking where business plans were
obsolete and issues such as value or profit were unimportant. The recent rise in the number of
business failures served as a harsh reminder that this mode of thinking had to change (See
Appendix A).
A retrospective examination of Priceline was used to illustrate what can happen to a
company when it disregards traditional business principles. There is no way of knowing
exactly what would happen if Priceline implemented the recommended changes based on the
strategy development and implementation model. Though this paper takes a definitive stance
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that the more Priceline uses traditional business principles, the greater the likelihood that it
will achieve financial success. This stance is bolstered by the comparison of Priceline to
CheapTickets, which has achieved and sustained financial success in today's economy
through its adherence to traditional business principles.
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Contribution Of Research
This section examines the conceptual contributions of current research in the on
going debate surrounding today's economy and the role of traditional business principles.
The limitations of this paper and the model that was developed and applied are then
considered. Recommendations for future research based on those limitations are
subsequently listed. Practical implications of the topics covered throughout the paper are then
examined and followed by concluding remarks.

Conceptual Contributions
Three contributions were offered in the paper that were theoretically or conceptually
based. First, early sections of this paper addressed misconceptions about today's economy
that have led to questionable decisions being made by those currently funding, running, or
working for Internet-based businesses. Theoretical assumptions were made regarding those
decisions in that they stemmed from a false understanding of what the Internet actually is and
how e-business and e-commerce actually work. Those discussions served to clarify those
misconceptions and examine how they may have led to poor business decisions.
Second, this paper demonstrated the absence of definitive proof that the post-Internet
economy is fundamentally different than the pre-Intemet economy. An analysis of how the
output growth rates of the pre-Intemet and post-Internet economies interacted with
unemployment rates and inflation rates illustrated this point. Although the growth rates did
interact differently, there was no conclusive evidence that today's economy is fundamentally
different than the economy of the past. Thus, the principles responsible for making
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businesses successful in the pre-Intemet economy are the same principles that will be
responsible for making businesses successful in the post-Internet economy.
The final conceptual contribution came from the discussion involving traditional
business principles and how many of the concepts based on those principles have evolved
over time. The effects of the Internet on several of these concepts were examined in the third
section, which culminated with the introduction of the strategy development and
implementation model. The model served as a framework for the principles and concepts
covered throughout the paper. The fourth section demonstrated how Priceline could use the
model in theory to incorporate the principles and evolved concepts to design and implement a
strategy that would result in a solid business model aimed at maximizing the value of its
stock.

Limitations Of The Paper
This paper offers an understanding of the subtle differences between the pre-Intemet
economy and the post-Internet economy and it does have limitations. The primary limitation
is that this paper was based solely on secondary research. No original studies and no direct
interviews were conducted while researching this paper. In the rapidly changing nature of
today's business environment, studies become obsolete and business practices change on a
daily basis. Rather than focus on a study likely obsolete by the time it was completed, the
decision was made to examine and subsequently apply the findings of secondary research
only.
Another limitation is the strategy development and implementation model was
applied to only one type of business - one that was purely an Internet-oriented company. Had
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the model been applied to a company like International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM), it would have undoubtedly provided more insight into the practicality of the model.
Implications of the model's application on companies implementing "clicks and bricks"
approaches, companies with a physical presence as well as an on-line presence, remains to be
seen.
Table 4 - Additional, In-Depth Information for Each Model Stage
Stage 1 - Clarification
Strategic Action Planning Now: A Guide for Setting and Meeting Your Goals

by Gate Gable
Section 1: Pre-planning Preparation

Stage 2 - External Focus
Market Driven Strategy: Processes for Creating Value

by George S. Day
Pt. 3. Assessing the Competitive Position
Chapter 5: Understanding Competitive Markets: Their Structure and Attractiveness
Chapter 6: Assessing Advantages
Wharton on Dynamic Competitive Strategy

by George S. Day (Editor), David J. Reibstein (Editor), Robert E. Gunther (Contributor)
Chapter 1: Assessing Competitive Arenas: Who Are Your Competitors?

Stage 3 - Internal Focus
The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action

by Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton
Chapter 5: Internal-Business-Process Perspective
Corporate Internet Planning Guide: Aligning Internet Strategy With Business Goals

by Richard J. Gascoyne, Koray Ozcubukcu
Chapter 1: A Call to Action: Build the Internet/Intranet into Your Business.
Chapter 2: Rediscovering Your Customer: Serving Existing Needs and Predicting New Ones

Stage 4 - Construction
Developing E-Business Systems and Architectures: A Manager *s Guide

by Paul Harmon, Michael Rosen, Michael Guttman
Chapter 3: Redesigning Business Processes for E-Business
Process Mapping: How to Reengineer Your Business Processes

by V. Daniel Hunt
Chapter 1: Do You Need a Roadmap? Reengineer Your Business Processes

Stage 5 - Implementation
e-Business 2,0: Roadmap for Success

by Ravi, Dr. Kalakota, Marcia Robinson, Don Tapscott
Chapter 13: Translating E-Business Strategy into Action: E-Blueprint Formulation
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The model also focused on a struggling company. This was done in an effort to
understand why the company was struggling and because it offered an opportunity to make
reconmiendations. Although cases like Priceline's offer a number of learning opportunities,
examining the characteristics and practices of companies successfully using the Internet to
improve their businesses would also provide tremendous learning opportunities.
Finally, the application of the model was admittedly a superficial one. Superficial
because the scope of this paper does not allow for a step-by-step approach as to how
Priceline should actually complete each stage of the model. Instead this example
demonstrated how the model could serve as a framework to identify the types of changes that
are necessary for a company like Priceline. Unfortunately, the research and the methodology
involved with topics like business-process reengineering are too information-rich to be
adequately discussed here. The table on the previous page provides a list of specific sources
of information that address these topics in more detail.

Recommendations For Future Research
Given the limitations of the resources described above, there are several
recommendations for future research. First, conduct field interviews of those actually
involved in today's economy. VCs, entrepreneurs, and dot-com employees would
undoubtedly offer some unique insights into what strategic business practices are in use
today. Such insights might lead to some intriguing studies to further augment these
discussions and analyses.
Second, examine a wider variety of companies utilizing the Internet. All types of
business models, from businesses operating as "Internet pure players" to those utilizing a
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"clicks and bricks" strategy, should be examined. Along those same lines, pre-Intemet
companies and post-Internet companies should also be evaluated. Initially understanding how
both established companies and start-up companies have incorporated the Internet into their
business models is important. Determining the reasons for the resulting successes and
failures experienced by such companies would especially enhance the topics addressed in this
paper.
The last recommendation is to combine the previous recommendations and further
develop the strategy development and implementation model. Insights gained from the field
interviews and the lessons learned from studying a variety of companies operating in the
current business environment would improve upon the relevance of the model. Although,
improving the relevance of the model is not solely dependent on the completion of the first
two recommendations. This could also be accomplished by applying, in theory or in practice,
the model's framework to various businesses.

Practical Implications
Although a lot can be said about being one of the first companies to enter a market, a
lot can also be said about going to market with a viable business model. Unfortunately many
companies learned that lesson the hard way and are no longer in business. Not surprisingly,
the companies that adhered to traditional business principles when integrating the Internet
into their businesses are reaping the rewards. Exhibit H illustrates the decreasing number of
IPOs in contrast to the increasing usage rates of several popular websites. Although the
number of Internet IPOs has significantly dropped off in recent months, the usage of websites
designed in a customer-centric fashion has taken off. This suggests that the promise of the
Internet is still relatively unfulfilled {Gartner Group, 1999).
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Businesses must realize that throwing good money after bad in an effort to fulfill that
promise is no longer acceptable. Rather than relying on investors with deep pockets to keep a
company in business, companies should instead rely on traditional business principles. This
paper and the model presented within provide a framework for developing a fundamentally
sound business model that can fulfill the promise of the Internet and truly achieve financial
success.

Conclusions
Although the economy has evolved as a result of the Internet, it has not proven to be
fundamentally "new." The Internet by itself is only a tool. Even the most powerful tools in
business cannot be used in place of traditional business principles. Based on that
understanding, this paper illustrates that many of the concepts are evolving as a result of the
Internet. As such, they are still relevant in today's economy because they are based on
proven business fundamentals. The massive number of Internet-based business failures over
the past year attests to this fact. Failed businesses demonstrate that the Internet, and
technology in general, are no substitute for a well-defined strategy aimed at delivering value
to customers and returning a profit to owners.
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Exhibit H

Rising Usage Rates of
Websites Amid Declining Rates of IPOs

COLLAPSING OR FOCUSING?
Over the past two years, the number
of Internet IPOs has grown with
dizzying speed- and crashed just
as fast.

POWERFUL LURE
Meanwhile^ though, most popular
Internet sites have continued to
increase their visitor numbers. (Figures
represent number of visitors to the top
five most-visited sites during the
quarter, in millions)
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Appendix A
2000 Dot-Com Layoffs and Shutdowns
A comprehensive list of job cuts and closures among Web commerce, content, and services
companies from January 2000 through December 2000.
Company Name

Status

AdMart
Online grocery and
delivery service

Closely held; backed by
Hong Kong tycoon Jimmy
Lai

AIIAdvantage.com
Online marketer

Closely held; pulled IPO in
June

AltaVista
Search engine

UnitofCMGI

Amazon.com
1 Online retailer
i APB Online
! Operated crime
i website

1
1

Sold to Safetytip.com for
$575,000 in September

In December, announced plans to
shut down, lay off 334 employees
Laid off 100 in September

!

Public

Action

1

Set plans in mid-September to lav
off 200. or about one-quarter of staff i
i
In Januarv, laid off about 150
employees, or 2% of work force
In June, laid off all 140 employees; i
in Julv, filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy
j

Closely held

In November, laid off 17% of its
work force and cut back operations

Closely held

Said it November it will lav off 56
employees, or about 6% of work
force

Asic Jeeves
! Search service

Public

Said it December it will cut 180 full- i
time jobs, or 25% of its work force

i Auctions.com
i Online auctioneer

Unit of closely held
Classified Ventures

Ceased operations in August;
Layoffs not disclosed

Autoweb.com
1 Online auto seller

Public

Said it November it will lav off 25%
of its work force

! Beautyjungle.com
Cosmetics seller

Closely held

Laid off 40 workers, or 60% of work
force, in October; shut down in
November

Bigwords.com
Closely held
i Online textbook seller

Closed down in October; laid off 100

ArtNet.com
i Art seller
Asia Online
Internet services
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Company Name

Status

Action

Boo.com
Clothing retailer

Entered liquidation in Mav; laid off 1
Brand name was acquired bv
most of 370 employees at the time;
Fashionmall: technologv
Fashionmall relaunched website in
bought bv Bright Station
October

Boxman
Music retailer

Closely held

Shut down in October, laid off its
120 employees

Online arm of Encyclopedia i Laid off 75 employees, or about 25%
Britannica.com
Online encyclopedia j Britannica
of work force, in November
CarOrder.com
Online auto seller

Unit of Trilogy Development;

CBS Internet Group
Unit of Viacom
Web publisher
ChamberBiz
Closely held
Small-business portal ;
Chinadotcom
China portal
Chipshot.com
Gol^gear seller

Public; hit high of $156 in
March, low of $6 in October

Defunct

Suspended operations in August; laid!
off 100 of remaining 140 workers |
' •
1
Cut 25 emplovees or 25% of staff, in !
late May
|

Laid off about 40 of 50 emplovees in 1
j
i October
Laid off 48, or 2.8%. in August
In October, filed for Chapter 11
I bankruptcy-court protection. In
November, Eco Associates
purchased assets for undisclosed
amount

1

|

Site shut down in September, putting i
about 20 employees out of work

Clickmango
U.K. health website

Closely held; backed by TV
star Joanna Lumley

CitiKey
Wireless European
city guide

Closely held; backed by
Laid off all 90 emplovees in
Crescendo Ventures, Atlas
Venture and Kennet Capital; | November, as company entered
liquidation
now in bankruptcy
proceedings

Covad
Communications
DSL provider

Public

Said in November it plans to lav off i
400 employees or 13% of its work
force

Cozone.com
Computer retailer

Unit of CompUSA

Shut down in March

CUseeMe Networks Public
Intemet video
services

Said in November it will eliminate
36 jobs, or 22% of work force
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Status

Company Name
Cyberhomes
Online real-estate
seller

Action

1

Closely held

Shut down in November

Closely held; pulled IPO
plans in June

Laid off 50 people, or one-third of
staff, in September

Digital
Entertainment
Network
Web content

Closely held

Closed down in Mav

Discovery.com
Online arm of
Discovery
Communications

Closely held

Laid off 45% of staff in November

Doubleclick
Online advertising
services

Public

Laid off undisclosed number of
workers, but less than 10%, in
December

Drkoop.com
Health news, advice

Public; stock peaked near
$20 last Dec., now trades
around $1

Laid off one-third of staff in May;
cut remaining staff bv another third i
in August, leaving about 80
employees

D^a.com
Buyers guide,
discussions

|

Closely held; editor is MTV
Loveline host Dr. Drew
DrDrew.com
Dating, health advice Pinskv; assets sold to
Drkoop.com in November

In September, laid off 14 of 20
remaining staffers, down from 70
three months earlier

! Drugstore.com
1 Retailer

Public; stock trades under $3,
In October, laid off 60 emplovees. or 1
down from high of $55 in
10% of work force
December

1 DSL.net
i DSL provider

Public

1 Egreetings.com
! Web retailer

Public; stock trades at under I
In October, said it plans to cut 60
$1 a share; CEO resigned in !
jobs, or 34% of work force
October

1 Emusic.com
1 Music download
; website

Public; stock trades at about ;
Laid off 20% of work force, or about
$1, down from high of
40 employees, in June
$19.63 in December

i E-Stamp
Logistics Firm

Public

Said in December it plans to cut 141
jobs, or 28% of its work force

Cut work force bv 30% to 84 in
November as it set plans to exit
online-postage business
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Company Name

Status

Action
In October, announced it will shut
down and let go almost all 164
employees

Eve.com
Cosmetics retailer

Closely held

Evite
Invitation service

Closely held, put itself up for Laid off 60% of its staff in
sale in November
November, in preparation for sale

Closely held; backed by
Firstlook.com
Movie, TV Previews : idealab!

Laid off 34 of its 103 employees in
October

Hrst-e group
Online bank

Closely held

Cut 69 jobs, or 17% of work force,
in October

Fogdog.com
Sporting goods
retailer

Acquired bv Global Sports in i With the purchase, 125 jobs out of
October for about $40
150 were planned to be cut
million in stock

Food.com
Online ordering,
content

Closely held, backed by
heavyweights McDonald's,
Kraft, TV Guide and
Blockbuster

In September, cut staff bv 100, or
50%; laid off two senior executives

Closely held

In August, cut staff by about 54

Foodline.com
Restaurant
reservations
provider

FreeScholarships.com
Unit of MathSoft
Education-financing |
content
Rival Netzero acquired
Freei Networks
Free Internet provider certain assets

Closed down in September,
eliminating 16 jobs
Filed for bankruptcv in October

Pulled IPO in June

Laid off most remaining workers in
November, set plans to shut down

Garden.com

Went public in September
^9; now trades under $1

Slashed work force bv 93 people, or
30%, in September; in November,
said it will close retail operations,
laying off 153 workers

G^r.com

Backed by Amazon.com,
Gear is now a unit of
Overstock.com

In September, firm lavs off 22; in
October, firm was bought bv
Overstock, which hires 45 remaining j
employees

Internet Pictures
360-degree imaging

Public

Cut 175 positions, or 20% of work
force, in October

Furniture.com
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Company Name

Status

Action

iXL Enterprises
Web consulting firm

Public

Eliminated 350 positions in
September

Kibu.com
Teen girls' website

Closely held; was backed by
Netscape co-founder Jim
Clark

Shut down website in October

Kozmo.com
Delivery service

Closelv held: pulled IPO in
August

Cut 24 jobs in June, then slashed 2751
jobs, or 10% of total, in August, then
another 40 later in the month

Lante
Internet consulting

Public

Living.com
Furniture retailer

Closely held; partner of
Amazon.com and Starbucks

Mail.com
E-mail provider

Public

Said in October it plans to lav off
15% of its 632 employees

Mall.com
Retail hub

Closely held

Cut 20 jobs, or 35% of staff, in
August

MaMaMedia
Content for kids

Closely held

In June, laid off 30 of 150 workers: !
in October, laid off 40%. or about 40
people: in November, cut staff again i
, to 15 people, as it tried to find
buyer, partner

Miadora
Online jeweler

Closely held

Closed site in September, lavine off
almost all 77 workers

More.com
Online pharmacy

Closely held

Cut staff bv 30% in October, follows i
20% reduction in June

Reduced staff bv 44 full-time and 21
part-time positions in December

i

In August, filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy and laid off 275
employees

i

;

i

i

Mortgage.com
Online mortgages

Public

Said in late October that it will close !
and lav off most of its 618
employees
[

MTVi
Music website

Unit of Viacom; in Sept,
pulled plans for IPO

Cut 105 people, or 25% of work
force, as it canceled IPO

MyPoints.com
Online marketing

Public; merged with
Cybergold this year

Cut 120 jobs in October in wake of !
Cybergold purchase

NBCi
Community and
content portal

Public, formed by merger of
Snap, Xoom and certain
NBC assets; stock trades
around $5, down from over
$100 in January

|

i

In August, cut 170 jobs, or 20% of
staff: in October, president quit: job :
won't be filled
i
i
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Company Name
News
Digital
Media

Next Media
Online publisher

OneMain.com
Internet service
provider
Onvia
Small-business hub
Oxygen Media
Cable-TV and
Internet content

Status
Online media division of
News Corp.

Action

1

Laid off about 15% of its news staff,
or 82 jobs, Reuters reported in
October

In Julv. sacked 98 workers at its
Web sites, appledaily.com and
nextmedia.com; in October, cut
Public; trades in Hong Kong i another 90 jobs and closed 11 of its 1
25 Web sites; in October, unit
AdMart Travel said it plans to shut
down
Acquired by Earthlink

Public
Closely held

Said in April it plans to cut work
force of 1,500 by 15% over next year
In September, cut 85 positions, or
about 16% of work force

Reduced staff bv 44 full-time and 21 i
part-time positions in December

Was joint venture of SAP
i Pandesic
E-conmierce services and Intel

Shut down in Julv; laid off all 400
workers

= pAsia
Retailer and
auctioneer

Said it November it laid off about
10% of its work force

Petopia
Pet-supplies retailer
; Pets.com
Pet-supplies retailer
Pixelon
j Streaming media
I technology
i

PlanetRx.com

Pop.com

Closely held

|

Closely held; affiliated with i Laid off 120 emplovees, or 60% of
its work force, in October
Petco
Public

In November, said it will shut down i
and laid off about 255 of its 320
]
employees

Defunct

Laid off most emplovees in Mav
after being forced into Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings

Public

Set plans to cut as much as 15% of
work force, or up to 50 jobs, and
move to Memphis, Tenn., from
Calif.

Closely held; backed by
Steven Spielberg and Ron
Howard

Closed operations, laid off 80 in
September
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Company Name

Status

Priceline.com Inc.
Public
Name-your-own-price •
retailer
Priceiine WebHouse Closely held affiliate of
Gas, grocery website s Priceline.com
Productopia
Buying guide
Pseudo
Programs
Web broadcaster

Closely held
Closely held

Action

1
Set plans in November to lav off 87 i
of its 535 employees; in December
said it would cut another 48 jobs and
postpone new services
Said in October it will close
operations, putting 375 out of work
—
•
'"• • •
-1
Closed down in October, putting
about 70 people out of work
1
Closed down in September, laving i
off 175 employees; had laid off 58 in!
June
Following round of lavoffs in Mav.
cut about two-thirds of remaining
work force in November, leaving it j
with 20 employees
j

Quepasa.com
Spanish-language
portal

Went public in June 1999

Quokka Sports
Sports news site

Laid off 90 employees, or 20% of
Public; acquired Total Sports
work force, in November after
in November
closing Total Sports deal

Reel.com
Movie retailer

Unit of Hollywood
Entertainment

Laid off all 150 employees in June,
refers buyers to Buy.com

Renren Media
Chinese Web portal

Public; News Corp. owns
minority stake

In August, laid off 102 workers, or
38% of work force

Riffage
Online music
company

Closely held

Said it December it will shut down
... _

1
i

Sandbox
Online games

Closely held

Said in November it will cut 30 jobs,
or one-quarter of work force

Sclent
Web consulting

Public

In December set plans to cut 25% of
its work force, or 460 positions

Scour
Online media filesharing service

Backers included talent
manager Michael Ovitz;
assets purchased by
Listen.com in November

Filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1
October and said it will shut down; it i
laid off 80% of work force in
!
September

Snowball.com
Teen content

Public

In third quarter, cut work force by
about 15%, or 50 people

Unit of Macromedia

Laid off 20 of its 170 employees in
September

Shockwave.com
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Company Name

Status

Action

Space.com
Outer space content

Closely held; run by former
CNN anchor Lou Dobbs

Stamps.com
Online postage

Public; trades under $5 a
share; CEO and CFO
resigned in October

Cut about 240 jobs in October, or
about 40% of the total

Stan Lee
Media
Online animation

Public

Eliminated 19 positions as part of
outsourcing deal in September

j

In October, cuts 22 jobs, or about
20% of work force

StarMedia
Public
Latin american portal ;

Cut 125 jobs, or 15%. in September

Streaniline.com
Grocery service

Went public in June 1999 at |
$10 a share; has traded below; Shut down in November
$1 since mid-August

Stockback
Online rewards firm

Closely held; backed by RRE
Cut work force bv 29 employees in
Ventures, Neo Carta
November
Ventures

Supertracks
Online music
distributer

Closely held

Laid off about 40 employees, or a
third of its workers, in September

theglobe.com
Web community

Public, trades at under $1 a
share

Cut 51 jobs in third quarter

Techies.com

Closely held; withdrew IPO
plans in May

Laid off 60 employees, or 12% of
staff, in June

ThingWorld
Internet multimedia
i technology

Closely held, backed by
Laid off 70% of staff, or 35 workers,
CMGI@ventures, Microsoft, :
in December
others

i

i
i

Tom.com
Hong Kong
portal

Laid off 80 people, or 16% of staff,
Public; trades in Hong Kong | in July; unit GoChinaGo cut 50 jobs
in August

Toysmart

Controlled by Disney

Site shut down in Mav; firm filed for
Chapter 11 in June

Urban Box Office
Urban content hub

Closely held

Filed for bankruptcy and laid off
most of 330 workers in November

Urbanfietch.com
Delivery service

j
J

Closelv held; stopped
delivering movies in
September and exited
consumer market entirelv in
October

1

i
j

j

Made substantial, undisclosed cuts
of 400-strong New York staff; cut all 1
60 jobs in London
j
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Company Name

Status

Action

Value
America
Retailer

In October, signed letter of
intent to sell most assets to
Merisel

Filed for Chapter 11 in August; laid
off 185 employees

Walker Digital
Intellectual property
developer

Closely held

Laid off about 80% of headquarters i
staff, or 100 workers, in November |

Public; formed by merger of
Healtheon, WebMD,
Carelnsite, others

Announced plans in September to
cut 1,100 jobs; co-CEO Arnold
resigned in October

Closely held

Shut down site

Public

Reduced staff by 85 jobs, or about
25% of work force, in December

Closely held

Closed down in September

WebMD
Health website
Worldsport
Sports website
Women.com
Internet publisher
Xenote
Song bookmarking'
; technology

1

Xpedior
Web consulting firm

In September, cut 270 jobs,
including 200 consultants: In
December, announced 380 more
lavoffs

Youbetcom
ONline horse racing

Closely held

Laid off 34 emplovees, or 29% of
staff, in November

Closely held; backed by
idealab

In October, cut half its staff of 95

ZipLink
Dial-up, DSL Internet Public
provider
1 Zip2.com

UnitofCMGI

|

i

Public; 80% owned by
PSINet, which is looking to
sell the stake

1 Z.com

i

1

Xceed
Public; stock peaked at $48 Said in September that it will cut 75
: E-business consultant ; in Jan., now trades around $1 | jobs, or 12% of work force

1

1

Said it will close its business, lav off
all employees, in November
In October, firm said about 140
emplovees would either be switched
to other CMGI jobs or let go

Source: The Wall Street Journal
http://interactive.wsj.coin/public/resources/documents/dotcomlayoffs.htm
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